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ABSTRACT. Research linking ethnic cleavages to economic underdevelopment is
a hallmark of recent efforts to explain economic growth. Similarly, the rule of law as a
credible commitment to property rights and contract enforcement is also identified
with economic development. Rather than treating these factors as rival explanations
for economic development around the world, I propose the rule of law as the causal
mechanism through which ethnic fractionalization (EF) influences growth in many
countries. I argue ethnic diversity negatively impacts the rule of law due to the
prevalence of ethnically-based patronage networks in developing countries. Public
officials, I argue, face greater incentives to undermine the rule of law in societies with
pervasive ethnic cleavages than in those without. I employ pooled cross-sectional,
time-series data for 55 developing countries between 1996 and 2010 to test my
theoretical argument. Ultimately, my research demonstrates ethnic fractionalization’s
deleterious effect on the rule of law and provides a uniform framework linking
demographic inputs to economic outcomes.
JEL Classification: K2, O47, Q01
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1. Introduction
The drive to explain underdevelopment occupies a significant portion of
recent economic and political science scholarship. Explanations in the literature hinge upon largely endogenous factors such as political institutions
or exogenous concerns such as geography or international markets.1 Increasingly, research highlights the negative influence of ethnic heterogeneity in
fostering growth and cooperation in society. For example, Easterly and Levine
(1997) tie ethnic fractionalization (EF) to slow economic development, low
income and inequitable distribution of wealth. Nauro et al. (2011) use a
sophisticated instrumental estimation technique and still find evidence con20

necting high levels of ethnic fractionalization to low levels of economic
growth (see also Scheuler and Weisbrod, 2010 and Campos, et al., 2007).
Additionally, Habyarimana et al. (2007) describe how EF undermines public
goods provision while La Porta et al. (1999) connect it to the low quality of
governance in many countries. Feldmann (2012) finds a connection between
high levels of ethnic fractionalization and high unemployment due to labormarket inefficiency and Cerqueti et al. (2012) identify a relationship between
high levels of fractionalization and high levels of corruption. Finally, Hodler
and Knight (2012) demonstrate the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Previous literature associates EF
with the distribution of resources and economic outcomes, but for the most
part only provides untested speculation as to the underlying mechanism
driving these relationships.2 Scholars still do not know precisely why high
levels of ethnic fractionalization lead to slow economic development. To help
inform policy, we must understand the mechanisms underpinning growth and
development to comprehend what any macro-level relationships between
ethnic fractionalization and economic development truly represent.
I argue ethnic cleavages in society limit economic development by undermining the rule of law. The institutional elements comprising the rule of law
currently occupy a privileged position in explanations of growth.3 In this
framework, societies governed by the rule of law feature the enforcement of
codified regulations and equitable adjudication of disputes. The rule of law
therefore influences economic development since economic decisions rest, in
part, on whether contracts and property rights are enforced. The rule of law
also influences investment decisions by altering the costs and risk of doing
business. Growing evidence demonstrates its importance for development,
yet we know relatively little about how the rule of law comes to exist in the
first place. Some recent work emphasizes institutions: regime type (democracy/
authoritarian), electoral rules, or the strength of institutional checks and
balances. Ignored, however, are a country’s demographics. This omission is
important because many developing countries contain a wide variety of ethnic
groups within their borders. Institutional solutions to bring about the rule of
law will fail unless they take into account the ethnically driven socio-economic
context in which they are implemented. Moreover, it stands to reason perceptions of the rule of law are driven by more than institutional phenomena.
Most analysis on the rule of law centers on the need for functioning legal
institutions that foster economic development. However, phenomena that
influence perceptions of a state’s commitment to uphold contracts and enforce statutes may be equally as important (Barro and Gordon 1983; Mauro
1995). Unexplored in the literature is how sociological variables such as ethnic
diversity, linguistic cleavages or religious schisms may influence perceptions
of governance.
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This investigation resolves problems in the literature in several ways.
First, I propose the rule of law as an intermediary conduit connecting ethnic
fractionalization to economic development. A large literature already ties
components of the rule of law such as property rights, contract enforcement
and equitable treatment in the legal system to economic development. I
provide a rationale for ethnic fractionalization’s influence on these phenomena
and in turn on economic development. Second, I test my theoretical argument
against panel data encompassing 55 developing countries from 1996–2010.
Developing countries exhibit substantial variance in their levels of EF, types
of political institutions and levels of the rule of law. They therefore offer an
excellent natural laboratory in which to explore potential relationships between
ethnicity, politics and economic development. In this vein, I explore whether
the relationship between ethnic composition and the rule of law is robust to
the inclusion of institutional variables often thought to influence assessments
of governance. I find a strong, consistent relationship between ethnic fractionalization and perceptions of the rule of law. The rule of law suffers as
ethnic divisions become more acute – even after controlling for factors thought
to influence the rule of law such as regime type, political institutions or the
level of wealth within a country.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes the theoretical rationale for linking ethnic fractionalization to the
rule of law. The second section describes the variables and methodology of
the project, while the final section describes the results, discusses their
implications and identifies a direction for future research.
2. Theory
Recent scholarship identifies ethnic fractionalization (EF) as an important
barrier to achieving economic development and political stability (Eifert, et
al., 2010, Annet, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Easterly and Levine
(1997) and Habyarimana et al. (2007) attribute EF’s negative influence on
economic growth to struggles over scarce resources that divide along ethnic
lines. For example, low spending on public goods may reflect ethnic divisions
generating disagreements on the distribution of state resources. In turn, low
provision of public goods maintains poverty for large segments of the population and may limit long-term economic growth. In a different vein, other
scholars contend ethnic fractionalization leads to dissatisfaction with government and increased public expenditure aimed at placating the populace
(Annet, 2001). Alesina et al. (1999) even identify this phenomenon in the
United States. Finally, several other studies have found evidence for ethnic
heterogeneity’s negative impact on social capital and trust in society, which
are in turn linked to economic development (Keefer and Knack, 1997;
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Alesina and La Ferrarra, 1999). However, none of the aforementioned studies
directly address and test ways in which ethnic divisions discourage investment and promote underdevelopment. Scholarship will suffer and policies will
fail to bring about economic development if policymakers cannot determine
the channels through which ethnic cleavages exert their influence. For instance, the literature on EF describes a negative relationship with development, yet prematurely promotes institutions to mitigate its consequences.
Easterly (2000) demonstrates the mitigating effects of legal protection for
minorities, property rights, contract enforcement on economic decline in
ethnically heterogeneous states. Such solutions are inadequate, however, if
these institutions depend directly on the ethnic divisions in society. We
currently do not know whether the economic gains Easterly observes stem
from establishing the rule of law in general or if the specific ethnic emphasis
of the policy generated economic growth. It is not possible to assess these
arguments and craft appropriate policy until we know why or how EF undermines economic development. Institutional solutions to ethnic cleavages
should only be proffered once scholars gain a complete understanding of
the way in which ethnic fractionalization decreases growth.
Scholarship from economics helps to uncover the mechanism connecting
ethnic fractionalization and economic development. For example, a mature
body of work identifies several institutional elements necessary for economic
development whose effectiveness may rest on a state’s ethnic divisions. Components of the rule of law, such as property rights, contract enforcement
and equitable treatment by the judiciary are deemed critical in stimulating
growth (Keefer and Knack, 2002; De Soto, 2000; Maravall and Przeworski,
2003; Glinavos, 2008; Haggard et al. 2008; Hare, 2007; and Butkiewicz and
Yanikkaya, 2006). Private enterprise, the argument goes, will be hindered
if the public assumes that contracts and regulations will not be enforced or
are unenforceable (North and Weingast 1989). Economic historians argue
that the state’s credible commitment to enforce property rights allowed for
the development of capital markets in the West (North and Weingast 1989;
Rapaczynski 1996; Riker and Weimer 1995). Another strain of literature identifies the ways in which transaction costs associated with entrepreneurial
activity in the developing world are associated with a lack of enforceable
property rights. Citizens lacking titled property or assurance against expropriation are neither able to obtain credit based on collateral holdings nor
reinvest capital in the development of private enterprise. The result is chronic
underdevelopment of state and society as inefficient informal markets drain
capital, prevent the collection of tax revenues, and preclude the provision
of public goods in areas such as health care and education (De Soto, 1989,
2000).
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Perceptions of the rule of law can spur both foreign and domestic investment, yet, the few studies that have examined property rights regimes and
the rule of law have focused mainly on their relationship to economic development. This begs an important question: what determines perceptions of
the rule of law in the first place? Political institutions may be an important
part of the explanation, but they are unreliable determinants due to difficulties
posed by disentangling myriad institutional elements and the endogeneity
problems their evolution generates. By contrast, the level of ethnic fractionalization in a state is largely determined before current institutions are
established in the developing world.4 It is therefore possible to measure the
potential impact of EF on the performance of state protections for the rule
of law.
I anticipate a negative relationship between EF and the rule of law due to
the incentives facing ethnically fractionalized public officials in developing
countries. Clan, tribal and ethnic divisions in this environment often take
precedence over national identity and may impact the credibility of national
policies. EF can lead to opaque business transactions based on ethnic divisions and mistrust of the bureaucracy due to ethnic clientelism (Van de
Walle, 2001). Economic development ultimately suffers as investment decisions become increasingly risky in ethnically-divided business environments.
In general, I expect powerful groups holding the reins of government to
treat out-group citizens disproportionately poorly due to pervasive ethnic
cleavages. Countries with two or more major ethnic divisions are therefore
likely to have more difficulty committing credibly to the rule of law than
ethnically homogenous countries. Specifically, I expect large ethnic divisions
to undermine any credible commitment to the rule of law through three main
conduits: property rights, contract enforcement and equitable treatment by
the judiciary. First, ethnic schisms can negatively impact perceptions of
property rights if nationalization of out-group possessions is disproportionately
common. It stands to reason that confidence in property rights will decrease
if the probability of having one’s assets nationalized is notably lower for
in-groups than out-groups as in public goods provision of Habyarimana et
al. (2007) and Easterly and Levine (1997). Second, contract enforcement
and perceptions of equitable treatment also suffer if politicians and judges
offer preferential treatment to members of their own ethnicity. By this
logic, increasing the number of ethnic groups in a country will damage the
credibility of contracts and the judiciary. This in turn will lead to declining
assessments of the rule of law, decreased investment and derailed development.
In addition to ethnic fractionalization, I follow the theoretical literature
and explore several institutional factors thought to influence the rule of law.
These encompass the impact of regime type, proportional representation (PR)
vs. single member plurality (SMP) systems, presidential vs. parliamentary
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governance, a country’s colonial heritage, income inequality and overall
levels of wealth on assessments of the rule of law.
Democracy
Democratization, among other things, is a process that increases the number
of veto players through political competition, constraints on the chief executive, and participation by an electorate. According to Kunicová and RoseAckerman (2005), participation, political competition, and constraints on
the chief executive all increase the ability of the population to monitor and
legally constrain politicians from engaging in corrupt behavior. Brown et al.
(2011) find a strong relationship between political polarization in democracies
and control of corruption. Competition in democracies creates incentives for
politicians to hold one another accountable. In the early stage of democratization, rent-seeking behavior actually increases. Only after a certain level
of democratization is reached will constraints be placed on malfeasance.
These relationships are likely to emulate those concerning the rule of lawespecially in the presence of high levels of ethnic fractionalization. There is
also considerable evidence democracy improves the provision of public goods
relative to authoritarian governance, which could indicate higher levels of
cooperation and higher levels of the rule of law in democracies (Olken,
2008, Keefer and Khemani, 2005).
Authoritarian governments are likely to harm the rule of law (Maravall
and Przeworski, 2003). For instance, military governments or other types of
authoritarian regimes may negatively impact the rule of law. An important
point of separation between the head of state and the head of the armed
forces is fused when the chief executive is a member of the military. Without proper divisions, the military as an institution becomes exposed to politics:
important decisions concerning promotion and retirement are made more
on the basis of politics than on strict protocols set out in the military code.
The military also becomes exposed to capture by private interests who now
have to lobby the military in order to gain favorable dispensation from the
government. The effect of each of these is likely exacerbated by high levels
of ethnic fractionalization. Military leaders who belong to a minority group
are likely to favor members of their own group over those of the majority,
while leaders from the majority may exclude the minority group from many
state programs. I expect military governments to produce negative assessments of the rule of law.
In contrast to the discussion above, there is some evidence suggesting
democracy may have a negative impact on the rule of law. For example,
Eifert et al. (2010) and Posner (2004) highlight the ways democratic competition politicizes and reinforces ethnic divisions. Democracy may very well
deepen ethnic cleavages in society and undermine public goods provision,
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cooperation and the rule of law more so than in dictatorships. Overall, I am
ambivalent as to whether democracy increases or decreases the ability of
leaders to favor one ethnic group over another and thereby undermine or
improve perceptions of the rule of law.
Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism
The second broad institutional variation emphasized in studies on assessments of governance is the choice between presidential and parliamentary
systems. For example, some scholars argue the centralization of power
under presidential arrangements offers executives greater opportunities for
malfeasance than does the legislative authority wielded by the leadership in
parliamentary systems (Kunicova, 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005;
Mainwaring, 1995; Shugart, 1998). While in presidential systems both the
party leadership and the chief executive must approve legislation, the president
frequently controls certain forms of patronage independent of a legislative
check, and may even create new types of distribution via executive orders.
With this unconstrained authority over the creation and distribution of patronage, presidents are more likely to engage in inappropriate political behavior
than are the heads of legislatures in parliamentary systems (Baldez and
Carey, 1999; Cox and Morganstern, 2001; Kiewit and McCubbins, 1991;
Sakwa, 2000). Parties are stronger in parliamentary systems, and checks are
weaker because parties in presidential systems are not required to organize
to form a government (Cox and Morganstern, 2001; Lijphart, 1984; Mainwaring, 1995; Shugart, 1998). Additionally, the uncertain timing of elections
may act to constrain parliamentary leadership due to the constant threat of
no-confidence votes and subsequent dissolution. I anticipate these arguments
to gain strength in ethnically-divided states. Coalition governments under
parliament are likely to represent broader interests in society than a solitary
executive. A single executive of one ethnic group is frequently given the
broad authority afforded presidents. The potential for unilateral action against
members of other ethnic groups thus increases dramatically relative to parliamentary systems featuring coalition governments. I expect this phenomenon
to generate more favorable assessments of the rule of law under parliamentary
governments than in presidential systems.
Electoral Rules
Persson and Tabellini (2003) identify a number of reasons why PR and SMP
systems are expected to create differing levels of governance. Individual
ballots under majoritarian systems, the argument goes, provide direct accountability for politicians, reducing opportunities for malfeasance. Yet at the same
time, Persson and Tabellini note that the higher barriers to entry normally
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associated with the smaller districts in plurality systems may give politicians
more room to maneuver. The more political competition is relegated to a
relatively few number of candidates in each district, the less chance political
outsiders will have to challenge corrupt incumbents. The theoretical expectation, therefore, is ambiguous for the rule of law: whether SMP or PR
produces greater respect for property rights and equitable adjudication of
grievances depends on the relative importance of each contradictory institutional mechanism (size of district vs. district magnitude). However, theoretical
reasons exist to expect PR to generate favorable assessments of the rule of
law. Powell (2000) argues that proportional representation systems generally
outperform plurality systems in translating votes into either majority governments or coalitions close to the median voter. Plurality winners do not often
hold views close to those of the median voter, yet are afforded a legislative
majority. Consequently, plurality winners avoid negotiating with smaller
parties across the ideological spectrum. As such, ethnically-based grievances
may not be translated into acceptable policies, which may actually lead to
lower public accountability in SMP systems. Furthermore, low barriers to
entry in PR systems guarantee minority representation in government once
a certain electoral threshold is met. This implies less accountability in
plurality systems, which may produce selective enforcement of the rule of
law – particularly for ethnically heterogeneous states. I expect systems
featuring proportional representation to generate more favorable assessments
of the rule of law than SMP arrangements.
Colonial Legacy
Former British colonies generally use a form of British Common Law whereas
former French, Belgian, Spanish, Portuguese, German or Dutch colonies
use a form of Civil Law. Two central differences between these families of
legal systems may influence the rule of law and subsequently, economic
development in former colonies.5 First, Common Law legal systems rely on
judicial precedent rather than legislative precedent to interpret the law.
Judges in these systems interpret legislation and set a binding precedent for
future interpretation of the law. These justices effectively add to the body of
laws, whereas judicial decisions often carry no lasting weight in countries
with Civil Law systems. Instead, legislative revisions or interpretations of
the law comprise the entirety of binding legal guidelines on a given matter
in these countries. The freedom to interpret laws rather than simply enforce
legislative wishes increases the probability judges with the power to set
legal precedent will protect the rule of law. This protection extends to the
rights of foreign firms and private property as demonstrated in La Porta et
al. (2002) and Djankov et al. (2002). Furthermore, judges’ independent decisions setting legal precedent protecting the rule of law generate expectations
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of future protections against the violation of private rights because it is
harder for judges to backtrack against legal precedent in the future. Judicial
independence through the ability to set precedent in Common Law systems
is thus a fundamental element of the legal system protecting both foreign
and domestic investors and the rule of law.
Second, judges gain independence from public and private pressures
through lifetime tenure in Common Law systems. The institutional context in
which judges operate makes a difference in the types of decisions they
make.6 For example, Besley and Coate (2003) find elected judges in the
United States pursue more populist policies than appointed ones in the area
of employment discrimination. This is not surprising: elected judges are
beholden to the whims of the public because they must compete in popular
elections at regular intervals. Elected judges cannot afford to make unpopular
decisions if they want to keep their jobs. In contrast, appointed justices’
insulation from political pressures translates into tougher stances against
tyranny of the majority and greater protection of political rights. Still, judges
with short appointments must concern themselves with their post-judicial
careers in case they are not reappointed. This necessity gives some judges an
incentive to provide selective benefits and preferential treatment to powerful
litigants who are potential future benefactors. Similarly, the judges are vulnerable to future threats from the public and private sphere. Threats of
punishment following judges’ departure from the bench render them more
likely to rule in favor of powerful litigants who could potentially harm them
in the future as well. Instead, judges often have lifetime tenure in Common
Law systems, but rarely do in Civil Law systems. Judges in Common law
systems are free to focus on the legal merits of a case as well as ignore
many of the positive and negative incentives associated with short judicial
terms. Lifetime tenure thus allows judges to contradict majority opinion and
anger powerful political constituencies if the judges’ interpretation of the law
demands it. The judiciary is therefore particularly important in preserving
fragile political rights. However, the courts’ ability to protect minority interests
against powerful executive or legislative impulses hinges on an independent
judiciary more prevalent under Common Law systems than in countries
using legal frameworks based on Civil Law. I therefore include a measure of
the legal code left behind as a measure of colonial legacy in my statistical
models to determine if this legacy is connected to the rule of law.
Alternative Explanations
In addition to regime type and political institutions, I estimate the relationship between the rule of law and a number of variables representing plausible
alternative explanations. For instance, low-income countries have a greater
incidence of corruption than high-income countries (Brown, et al. 2011,
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Treisman, 2000). Bureaucrats in developing societies receive salaries that
are sufficiently low to entice corrupt behavior. Low-income societies may
also lack the institutions for detecting public malfeasance – especially when
such behavior follows ethnic patterns. Minority groups will bear the costs of
systematic denial of public services in such systems and thus generate lower
perceptions of the rule of law. I also expect poorer countries to exhibit low
perceptions of the rule of law. Similarly, income inequality may fall along
ethnic lines and decrease perceptions of government performance. Research
on China notes a connection between social unrest and growing economic
inequality (Khan and Riskin, 1998; Rozelle, 1996). Inequality, the argument
goes, can generate the popular belief that distributional gains by the elite
result from collusion with the government through corrupt practices. The
polarization of ethnic, political, or social groups around the distribution of
material wealth may frequently constitute the central issue in national politics
(Lichbach, 1989), producing a heightened awareness or inegalitarian legislation
or unprotected rights.
3. Model Specification and Estimation
I construct a pooled time series dataset for the years from 1996 to 2010
stemming from a variety of databases on the dimensions of governance,
aspects of the political institutions in the included countries, and the countries’ socioeconomic attributes. I use data from 1996–2010 because the World
Bank Institute gathered data on governance, including an indicator for the
rule of law over this timeframe. I use Alesina et al.’s (2003) data on ethnic
fractionalization and the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et. al. 2010) for data on political institutions. I limit my dataset to
developing countries for two reasons. First, developing countries face great
barriers to economic development resulting in continued poverty and endangerment for the population of these countries. Determining whether the level
of EF, which is often high in developing countries, influences the rule of law
and in turn economic development may be critical for designing policies to
overcome barriers to economic development. In contrast, industrialized
countries face different challenges in continuing their economic trajectories
relative to developing countries. Industrialized have for the most part already
established the rule of law and do not exhibit very much variance from one
country to the next. Developed countries are therefore not as interesting to
study from a theoretical standpoint compared to developing countries because
they have resolved any problems they may have had with EF and the rule
of law. Second, I omit developed countries from my dataset for practical
reasons. I want to know whether ethnic fractionalization influences the rule
of law while controlling for the level of wealth in a country at the time EF
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is observed as well as the political institutions in a country. Previous scholarship suggests the level of wealth is important for the rule of law along with
the political institutions within a country. Wealth and the structure of the
political system are therefore important control variables I cannot afford to
omit from any model of the rule of law. However, the level of wealth within
a country and the level of democracy are multicollinear with the level of
ethnic fractionalization among developed, but not developing countries. Including observations from developed countries for wealth and political institutions
in my dataset would thus bias my model and lead to mistaken inferences
regarding any connection between EF and the rule of law. I therefore exclude
developed countries from my model of the rule of law.7
I estimate my model using time-series, cross-sectional regression with
panel corrected standard errors. I also estimate a second model using OLS
with robust standard errors as a robustness check on the first model.8 The
model I specify includes ethnic fractionalization, institutional variables, a
number of control variables, as well as both regional and time effect dummy
variables. I also account for rival hypotheses such as income (GDP per
capita, PPP) and income inequality. The appendix includes a full discussion
of the variables, their measurement, and sources for the data.
Table 1 Rule of Law Score Regressed on EF, Political and Economic Variables
Variable

TSCS Coefficient/(PCSE)

Ethnic Fractionalization

OLS, Robust SE
Coefficient/(SE)
-0.357
(0.026)**
0.093
(0.030)*
0.054
(0.041)
0.064
(0.032)*
0.192
(0.010)**
0.510
(0.030)**

-0.409
(0.015)**
Polity
0.018
(0.007)*
PR
0.136
(0.141)
Presidentialism
0.042
(0.066)
Colonial Legacy
0.150
(0.035)**
GDP/capita (logged)
0.446
(0.029)**
Rule of Law (Lagged)
0.231
(0.092)*
Income Inequality
-0.216
-0.075
(0.082)*
(0.063)
Constant
-1.140
-2.451
(0.002)**
(0.070)**
Region and Year Fixed Effects
Included
Observations
624
712
R-squared
0.88
0.83
Panel Corrected/Robust standard errors in parentheses: *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%

30

4. Discussion
The most striking feature of my estimates is the strong negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the rule of law.9 As hypothesized,
high levels of EF are associated with low levels of the rule of law. Moving
from a mean level of EF to one standard deviation above the mean results
in a 19% decline in estimates of the rule of law while holding all other
variables constant at their means. Of course, there are considerable differences
between countries aside from their levels of EF that could influence the rule
of law observations in each country. The level of EF is certainly not the
only factor determining the level of the rule of law a country experiences.
However, my estimate does serve as a strong example of how important EF
is for the rule of law in my dataset. The presence of political institutions in
the model also produces substantively interesting results: democracy and
wealth both improve perceptions of the rule of law. Conversely, income
inequality and non-British colonial legacies damage those perceptions. The
remaining institutional variables are not statistically significant.
5. Conclusion
Previous literature connects ethnic fractionalization and the rule of law to
economic development, but not to each other. I clarify the relationships
between these concepts and present evidence identifying EF as a strong
determinant of the rule of law, which in turn leads to economic growth.
Political institutions, when a full model is specified, are not privileged in
the ranking of potential determinants of the rule of law. Instead, ethnic
fractionalization informs our understanding of public perceptions of the rule
of law in a fully-specified model. Political institutions do not.
A government’s ability to make credible their commitment to the rule of
law is contingent upon the ethnic composition of society. In one sense, my
research does not provide reasons to be optimistic about taking institutional
steps to address the perceptions of the rule of law in the face of high ethnic
fractionalization, because EF does not change very quickly and colonial
legacy does not change at all (although its impact may become weaker over
time). However, the strong positive relationship between a country’s wealth
and the rule of law indicates pro-growth policies may improve the government’s protection of the rule of law even if reforming political institutions
does not. In this sense, governments do have some policy options at their
disposals to mitigate the negative influence of EF on the rule of law. Furthermore, my results provide evidence for a causal chain between EF, the
rule of law and economic development. They also carry the implication that
policy solutions designed to increase economic development in countries with
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high levels of EF will fail if they do not also address EF’s relationship with
the rule of law. Ultimately, my investigation demonstrates the utility of
exploring the intermediate connections between macro-level indicators such
as EF and economic development before policies can resolve problems in
these areas.
Appendix
This appendix describes the variables collected for the countries included in
this study. Much of the data was generated by projects at the World Bank:
The Database on Political Institutions (DPI) and the Governance Matters
database. The former offers cross-country data chronicling the political institutions of 177 states whereas the latter measures perceptions of governance
in 199. The data stem from work performed by Beck, et al. (2000) and
Kaufmann, et al. (2010). The variables I employ are catalogued below.
Dependent Variable
Perceptions of the Rule of Law: Preliminary explorations employ the World
Bank’s Governance IV indicator, which measures the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. It is compiled through
solicitation of survey responses from elite actors within a given state regarding the frequency of extra payments to “get things done” and responses to
other broad questions regarding the predatory nature of the state. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts and property rights. This
indicator measures the extent to which fair and predictable rules form the
basis for economic and political interactions and the extent to which property
rights are protected. Project researchers use a weighted average of the
sources for each country as their best estimate of that state’s governance with
the weights being proportional to the reliability of each source. The resulting aggregate governance indicators have an expected value (across countries)
of zero, and a standard deviation of one. This suggests that almost every
score lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better
governance. The original data was gathered from over twenty-five different
sources by eighteen organizations such as the Afrobarometer, Freedom House,
Gallup International, Political Risk Services, US Dept of State, World Bank,
etc. Source: Governance Matters IV Database (Kaufmann, et al. 2010).
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Independent Variables
Ethnic Fractionalization
My primary independent variable is ethnic fractionalization, which describes
the level of ethnic divisions in a state’s population. The variable I employ
stems from Alesina et al.’s 2003 dataset. Alesina et al. calculate the likelihood that two randomly-selected individuals in a country belong to the
same ethnic group. I use data from 2003, but EF does not change quickly;
Roeder (2001) establishes this argument by comparing 1985 values with those
of the 1961. I perform a robustness check with respect to the EF data’s
validity and reliability by comparing my results with new estimates using
Fearon’s (2003) data. The results of the regression analysis are very similar:
all coefficients have same direction, same levels of statistical significance
and similar magnitudes.
Democracy
I use the Polity score of each country as a proxy for the level of democracy
vs. autocracy within its political system. These distinctions are based on the
general “openness” or “closedness” of political institutions as determined by
Polity IV scholars through examination of numerous indicators such as the
constraints on the chief executive, the regulation and competitiveness of
participation, the openness of executive recruitment, etc. Scores are generated
by subtracting aggregate “autocracy” from “democracy” to create a range
of -10 to 10 with ten being the most democratic and -10 the most autocratic
for 2000. Following Montinola and Jackman (2002), we include in the
regression both polity and its square. Inclusion or exclusion of the squared
term does not affect the estimates reported in Table 1. Source: Polity IV
data set developed by Gurr et al. (2010).
Ln GDP/Capita PPP
This variable records the natural log of each state’s per capita Gross Domestic
Product for each year in the database. GDP/per capita is in 2000 dollars and
is adjusted for purchasing power parity. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012.
Colonial Legacy
This variable records whether the country uses a Common Law or Civil Law
legal system as a proxy for the legal institutions left behind by colonial
powers. Common Law legal systems receive a score of “1” while all others
are scored “0” for this indicator. Source: US State Department. World Law
database 2012.
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Income Inequality
The Gini index measures the level of income inequality within society and
is recorded as a number between “0” and “1”, where “0” describes perfect
equality (everyone has identical income) and “1” refers to perfect inequality
(one person earns all income while all others earn nothing). If the area
between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve is A, and the area
underneath the Lorenz curve is B, the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B). This is
expressed in the data as the numerical equivalent of this percentage, which
is always between 0 and 100. Source: World Bank, World Development
Indicators, 2010.
Proportional Representation
This variable describes whether a state uses proportional representation to
elect all or a portion of its legislators. A political system is coded “1” if
either chamber of the legislature is elected based on the percent of votes
received by their party and/or if Beck, et al.’s sources specifically refer to
the system in question as “proportional.” The state is coded “0” if these
conditions do not apply. N/A is recorded if the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness for the country is 4 or lower, meaning that there is
competition for seats, albeit in a one-party system. Source: Beck, et al. (2010).
Presidential Systems
This variable designates political systems as either presidential, assemblyelected presidential or parliamentary. The system is coded presidential (0)
if a single executive is elected by popular vote. Additionally, a system is
coded presidential if the chief executive is elected by an assembly and can
only be recalled by a two-thirds vote or dissolution of the assembly. The
system is coded “1” if the assembly elects, but cannot recall the chief
executive. Finally, in cases where both a president and prime minister exist,
a system is deemed presidential only after passing a three-part test. First,
the president must be able to veto legislation while the parliament may only
override if it possesses a supermajority. Second, the president must be
allowed to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers (including the PM) and to
dissolve parliament. Third Beck, et al. classify a system as presidential (0)
if the available data does not clarify the executive’s abilities on the first
two counts, yet Beck, et al.’s sources still refer to the president as the key
decision-maker. The system is coded as parliamentary (2) if the preceding
conditions do not hold. Source: DPI (Beck, et al. 2010).
Lagged Rule of Law
I include a variable for the previous year’s rule of law score to account for
the possibility the rule of law score for a country in one year is dependent
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on the previous year’s score. I include a control for this potential temporal
dependency in the TSCS model.
Geographic Region
I create regional dummy variables to control for a country’s geographical
location. Latin American and Caribbean, North America, Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, and African dummies are included as I anticipate potential
regional influence on perceptions of corruption. Each country is coded one
for the region in which it is located and zero for all other regions.
Year Dummies (1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
I create dummy variables for each year in the model to control for any
unobserved phenomena imparting a temporal bias to my model.
NOTES
1. A summary of New Institutional Economics over the last 30 years provides an
excellent source detailing institutional explanations in a number of important areas.
See Brousseau and Glachant, 2008 or Williamson, 2000. Others privilege geographical
arguments (Gallup, Sachs, Mellinger, 1998 or Hausman, 2001) or international market
volatility (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
2. Knack and Keefer (1997) surpass earlier efforts by demonstrating ethnic
homogeneity’s impact on the level of social trust, which is often tied to economic
development while Habyarimana et al. (2007) go even farther and explain EF’s ties
to public goods provision. Despite these advancements, theoretical gaps remain when
tying social trust to institutional channels of economic development. Low levels of
social trust are associated with low levels of growth, but the relationship is devoid
of a testable causal chain. Alesina et al. (2003) argue ethnic fractionalization influences growth through bad policy, but this claim is difficult to evaluate as well.
3. Institutional economists have made a cottage industry from these assertions.
See North and Weingast (1989), De Soto (2000), Keefer and Stasavage (2003) among
many others, Coase, Demsetz, etc.
4. See Glaeser et al. (2004).
5. See La Porta et al. 2002, 2004, Djankov et al. 2002, 2003.
6. See Brace and Gann-Hall (1995).
7. The countries I select are those in the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators Database that fall more than one standard deviation below the mean in
2010 GDP/capita PPP
8. There is a debate as to the appropriateness of time-series, cross-sectional
regression and panel-corrected standard errors when the dependent variable (in this
case the rule of law) does not change very rapidly over time. Furthermore, my data
contains many more cross-sectional observations than temporal observations. In
these cases the data more-closely resembles a cross-section than a time-series or a
balanced panel. Times series, cross-sectional (TSCS) estimation with panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSEs) might bias the estimates and limit inferences. I therefore also
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estimate a model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors appropriate
for cross sectional data and present the results along with TSCS, PCSE estimation.
The coefficients and significant levels are quite similar across both estimation techniques.
9. See Table 1. The magnitude of the relationship between EF and ROL is
greater than all others’ save GDP/capita and is significant at the .01 level. ‘’
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